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for in Rule 42(b) which provides the trial court with broad discretion
to grant separate trials.4 0
W. Stokes Harris, Jr.
MIpEACHM NT OF Wrnmss CEDiBn Y By USE OF PAST CONVICrMON
EVImNcE-KENTUCKY COuRT OF APPEALS ADOPTS A NEW RuLE.-Over
seventy years ago James Thayer laid the foundation for the modem
trends in evidence law. Thayer proposed that "unless excluded by
some rule or principle of law, all that is logically probative is admis-
sible."1 Since that time, courts have moved steadily toward an open
door policy of admissibility, closing that door only when confronted
with irrelevant or prejudicial material.2 The effect of this liberalization
of admissibility has been to place a greater burden on the trial judge
to define relevancy and to instruct on the weight of evidence, and a
greater burden on the whole system to assure witness credibility.
Most crucial to our judicial system is the assumption that judges
and juries can believe what witnesses say. To assure this critical
element of credibility, a number of devices have evolved within the
judicial system.3 The most effective of these is the operation of cross-
examination as a part of the advocacy tradition.4 Cross-examination is
particularily suited for credibility testing since it inevitably probes the
weaknesses and inconsistencies in the fabric of testimony. It is this
effectiveness as a credibility test which partially accounts for the
trend toward liberality in the scope of cross-examination.5
The most serious test of witness credibility occurs when cross-
examination is used as a vehicle for impeachment. As the Thayer-
initiated trend toward greater admissibility has spread, the methods
4o Rule 42. Consolidation; Separate Trials
(b) Separate Trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition
and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counter-
claim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of
claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims or issues, always
preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United
States.
I J. THmA, PREInvnNAny TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 265 (1898).
2 See Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 167
(1940).
3 The most obvious of these is the requirement that witnesses be sworn to
tell the truth and the development of sanctions to be applied in the event of
perjury. For a discussion of other credibility tests, see Ladd, supra note 2, at
167-71.
4 Ladd, supra note 2, at 167-71.
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of impeachment on cross-examination have expanded accordingly. It
is now possible in Kentucky 6 and most other states, as well as in the
federal courts,7 to impeach a witness by demonstrating existence of
prior contradictory or inconsistent statements, by offering evidence
regarding the general reputation for truth and veracity of a witness,
or by proving the existence of prior criminal convictions. This latter
method of impeachment is the major concern of this comment. In-
creasing criticism of impeachment by past conviction evidence has
focused on the contentions that as a credibility test it is ineffective or
misleading and often is incurably prejudicial to a defendant-witness.8
Our purpose here is to examine the traditional approach to past
conviction evidence and to give special attention to criticism of the
technique of impeachment by past conviction evidence. The result
of this examination will be the realization that the Kentucky Court
of Appeals has recently adopted a much needed change in the opera-
tion of this traditional method of impeachment.
Under the earliest common law, convictions for infamous crimes
completely disqualified one as a witness.9 This rule was eventually
abolished by the states in favor of the general rule that prior criminal
convictions could be used to impeach the credibility of a witness. 10
The traditional rationale in defense of allowing this method of im-
peachment is that the jury is entitled to any information it can use in
evaluating witness credibility." Past convictions are ideally suited
since, as Wigmore suggests, there is no risk of confusion of issues and
there is no danger of unfair surprise to the witness. 12 Summarizing
this traditional rationale, several courts have noted:
The object of a trial is not solely to surround the accused with
legal safeguards, but also to discover the truth. What a person is
often determines whether he should be believed. When a de-
fendant voluntarily testifies in a criminal case, he asks the jury to
accept his word. No sufficient reason appears why the jury should
not be informed what sort of person is asking them to take his
KY. R. Crv. P. 43.07. Previously an identical provision was found in Ky.
Crv. CODE PA~. § 597.
7 FE. R. Crv. R. 23.8 See Note, The Use of Bad Character and Prior Convictions to Impeach a
Defendant-Witness, 34 Fonm am L. REV. 107 (1965); Note, Impeachment of the
Defendant-Witness by Prior Convictions, 12 ST. LouIs L.J. 277 (1967); Note, The
Use of Prior Convictions to Impeach Credibility of the Criminal Defendant, 71
W. VA. L. REV. 160 (1969).
9 C. McCoRMscy, EVIDENCE [hereinafter McConmcIC] § 43 (1954). The so-
called "infamous crimes" were treason, felonies, and acts involving falsehood.1o Id.; 3 J. WIGooRE, EVIDENCE [hereinafter WiGMORE] § 980 (3d ed. 1940).
"1 State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 235 A.2d 111 (1967); State v. Duke, 100
N.H. 292, 123 A.2d 745 (1965).
12 3 WioMoRE § 980.
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word. In transactions of everyday life this is probably the first thing
that they would wish to know .... Lack of trustworthiness may
be evidenced by his abiding and repeated contempt for laws which
he is legally and morally bound to obey .... 13
It is a fundamental rule in the law of evidence that the prosecution
may not introduce evidence solely for the purpose of showing that the
defendant has a criminal disposition.14 Such evidence is inadmissible
on the basis that it is highly prejudicial, i.e. that it is highly probable
that the defendant will be convicted because of his character rather
than his guilt. However, once the defendant testifies in his own
behalf, his previous convictions generally are admissible to impeach
his credibility as a witness. "Thus with a wave of the evidentiary
wand, what previously was too prejudicial to be heard by the jury
becomes reliable [and] valid evidence."15 It is submitted that in order
to justify the traditional rationale, two assumptions are necessary:
first, that all criminal convictions relate to veracity; second, that a
juror can distinguish between impeaching evidence and substantive
evidence.16
As the rationale underlying use of prior convictions indicates, the
admission of such convictions is supposed to aid the jury in evaluating
witness credibility. To accomplish this, the prior convictions admitted
should have some relationship to witness motivation or inclination to
tell the truth.'7 Herein lies the biggest objection to the present
procedure for admitting prior convictions into evidence. There has
been widespread disagreement as to what types of crimes could be
shown to impeach the credibility of a witness. Some jurisdictions
allow impeachment only for the so-called "infamous crimes,"' 8 while
others limit impeachment to "felonies."19 A few jurisdictions, more
careful in applying the basic rationale, admit only those convictions
for crimes of moral turpitude, whether felonies or misdemeanors.2 0
A fourth group of jurisdictions would allow evidence of any convic-
tion regardless of degree of seriousness or degree of relatedness to
moral turpitude.21
The objection most commonly made to the traditional rationale is
13 State v. Duke 100 N.H. 292, 293-94, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956).14 McCoTncK 1 43; 1 WIGMoRE §§ 57, 193.
15 12 ST. Louis L.J., supra note 8, at 278.
16 15 S.D. L. REv. 160, 163 (1970).
17 Ladd, supra note 2, at 174-84.
'8 E.g., People v. Dilella, 52 Ill. App. 2d 403, 202 N.E.2d 77 (1964); People
v. Thomas, 393 IMI. 573, 67 N.E.2d 192 (1946).
19 E.g., State v. Mangrum, 98 Ariz. 279, 403 P.2d 925 (1965); State v. Sorrell,
85 Ariz. 173, 333 P.2d 1081 (1959).2 0 E.g., Nutter v. Dearing, 400 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).21 E.g., State v. Friedman, 124 W. Va. 4, 18 S.E.2d 653 (1942).
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based on simple considerations of relevancy. Clearly not every crime
reflects upon the credibility or veracity of one convicted of that crime.22
Crimes of passion (murder) or negligence (involuntary manslaughter)
are obvious examples.23 An equally forceful example is statutory rape.
One commentator gives this illustration of the possibility of absurd
and irrational use of a past conviction:
Take homicide in the way of duelling. Two men quarrel; one of
them calls the other a liar. So highly does he prize the reputation
of veracity, that, rather than suffer a stain to remain upon it, he
determines to risk his life, challenges his adversary to fight, and
kills him. Jurisprudence, in its sapience, knowing no difference
between homicide by consent, by which no other human being is
put in fear-and homicide in pursuit of a scheme of highway rob-
bery, of nocturnal housebreaking, by which every man who has a
life is put in fear of it,-has made the one and the other murder,
and consequently felony. The man prefers death to the imputation
of a lie,-and the inference of the law is, that he cannot open his
mouth but lies will issue from it. Such are the inconsistencies
which are unavoidable in the application of any rule which takes
improbity for a ground of exclusion.2 4
There are of course many felony crimes not traditionally defined
as involving moral turpitude which do have a direct relationship to
witness credibility. Robbery, burglary, or larceny certainly indicate a
type of dishonesty related to a willingness to falsify for personal
gains.25 The point of criticism is that to admit all felony convictions
is to admit into evidence many irrelevant and possibly prejudicial
crimes. 26 On the other hand, to restrict admissions to convictions of
22 State v. Webb, 99 W.Va. 225, 128 S.E. 97 (1925) where the court notes
that crimes of violence often have little relationship to credibility. See McCoRNucK;
Ladd supra note 2.
3 State v. Webb, 99 W. Va. 225, 128 S.E. 97 (1925).
24 7 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JumcriA.L EVmIENCE 407 (Bowing ed.), quoted
in 2 WIGMORE § 519; Ladd, supra note 2, at 178-79; Note, 12 ST. Louis L.J., supra
note 8, at 280.25 Ladd notes:
If the witness had no compunctions against stealing another's property or
taking it away from him by physical threat or force, it is hard to see why
he would hesitate to obtain an advantage for himself or friend in a trial
by giving false testimony. Furthermore, such criminal acts, though
evidenced by a single conviction, may represent such a marked breach
from sanctioned conduct that it affords a reasonable basis of future pre-
diction upon credibility. It is quite possible that with each other the
robber class hold to some code of honor, but it is unlikely that it would
express itself in court proceedings if there were a motive to falsify.
Ladd, supra note 2, at 180.
26 In Gordon v. United States, 388 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), Chief Justice
Warren Burger, while on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, stated:
Acts of violence... which may result from a short temper, a combative
nature, extreme provocation, or other causes, generally have little or no
(Continued on next page)
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"crimen falsi" is equally unsatisfactory since such a restriction excludes
many crimes which are related to witness credibility.27
The only real solution to this problem is sincere effort to categorize
types of crimes according to their relationship to credibility.2s This
is not as difficult as it might seem since every crime is composed of a
set of elements which can be analyzed and related to credibility.
If such an analysis were attempted there would be a definite category
of admissible felonies (robbery, burglary, larceny, etc.) and a category
of admissible "crimen falsi" (perjury, forgery, bribery, etc.) which are
not ordinarily classified as felonies.29 In addition there would be a list
of crimes admissible at judicial discretion. 0 This list of "possible
admissions" would include crimes which under special circumstances
might relate to credibility-murders, 31 sex crimes,32 etc.3 3 Such a
categorization would not only aid in confining impeachment by prior
conviction to crimes related to credibility, but would also eliminate
the prejudice inherent in unrestricted admission of past convictions.
It is clear that the basic rationale for allowing impeachment by
prior convictions finds little logical support due to the frequent
irrelevance of a conviction to witness credibility. However, even if a
significant relationship can be found between conviction and credibility
in a given instance, the court is still faced with the problem of
prejudice. The problem is particularly acute when the defendant
with a record of prior convictions testifies in his own defense.34
The judge must assure that the evidence of the prior conviction is used
only as an aid in evaluating credibility and not as a factor establishing
guilt or innocence. The jury also cannot be allowed to infer from the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
direct bearing on honesty and veracity. A 'rule of thumb' thus should be
that convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility
whereas those of a violent or assaultive crime generally do not ...
Id. at 940; see note 22 supra.27 Supra note 25. Such crimes as robbery, burglary and larceny, are not
generally included in the category of "crimen falsi." Thus a restriction to crimen
falsi would result in elimination of these crimes whose probative value is the
greatest.
28 Such an effort to categorize is proposed by the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 106 (1942) which recognizes for impeachment purposes only those crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement. These crimes are admissable regardless
of their designation as felony or misdemeanor since it is the nature of the crime,
rather than the type of sentence imposed, which reflects on the credibility of the
witness. See Ladd, supra note 2, at 176-77.29 Ladd, supra note 2, at 180-82.
30 This concept of judicial discretion in admission of prior conviction evidence
will be treated at length infra.
31 See notes 22-26 supra, and accompanying text.
32 3 Wigmore § 924a; see Ladd, supra note 2, at 180-81.
83 Id.
34 Supra note 8.
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prior conviction that an accused has criminal tendencies or a bad
character.3 5
The traditional method of "assuring" that the jury will use evidence
of prior conviction for the proper purpose is the limiting instruction: 36
The jury will consider the evidence of the defendant that he has
been convicted of a felony only in so far as it may affect his
credibility as a witness, if it does so, and for no other purpose.
It neither proves nor disproves his guilt or innocence on this
charge. 7
Needless to say, there is a serious question regarding the effective-
ness of such an instruction.38 As Justice Jackson noted in Krulewitch v.
United States.,39 "[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury,.. . all practicing lawyers know
to be unmitigated fiction."40 The ineffectiveness of such an instruction
may result in the jury's drawing either of two legally impermissible
inferences from prior conviction evidence. First is the tendency toward
the logical fallacy of inferring from past conviction that an accused
has a criminal disposition and is, in effect, an addict of crime. From
this faulty logic the jury may conclude that the defendant probably is
guilty of the current charge.41 A second common tendency is noted
by Wigmore:
The deep tendency of human nature to punish, not because our
victim (defendant) is guilty this time, but because he is a bad
man and may as well be condemned now that he is caught, is a
tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in and out of
court.42
35 Of course, impeachment of credibility is not the only way in which prior
convictions can be used against the defendant. Previous convictions can be used
to establish that the accused has committed other crimes using a similar method
of operation, or to establish intent, motive or malice. State v. Cote 108 N.H. 290,
235 A. 2d 111 (1967); McComincK § 157. Here again the judge must assure
that the evidence of past convictions can be used by the jury only for the
specific purpose for which it is received. See Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its
Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. Rv. 264 (1966).
30 51 Mnmi. L. REV., supra note 35.
3 7 Hunt v. Commonwealth, 273 Ky. 806, 817, 117 S.W.2d 1010, 1015 (1938).
For other versions of limiting instructions, see State v. Heusack, 189 Mo. 295, 88
S.W. 21 (1905); Leftwick v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 204, 116 S.W. 817 (1909).
38In Harrison v. State, 217 Tenn. 31, 394 S.W.2d 713 (1965) the court
stated:
There are limits to the human mind. We think to say to any jury, there
is evidence here the defendant... has been guilty of several prior crimes
but you are not to consider this in determining his guilt or innocence
of the present crime, is at best to severely test the ability of the mind to
remove all prejudice therefrom. Id. at 35, 394 S.W.2d at 717.
39 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
40 Id. at 453 (Jackson, J., concurring).
41 See United States v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1962).
42 1 WIGMORE § 57. See Ladd, supra note 2, at 187; 51 Mnqr. L. REv., supra
note 35, at 281.
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The repeated assertions that prior conviction evidence is unduly
prejudicial and that the so-called limiting instructions are ineffective
in eliminating this prejudice are verified by jury studies undertaken
at the University of Chicago Law School and reported in The American
jury.43 In analyzing the problem, defendants who testified in their
own defense were divided into two groups. The first was composed
of defendants with no prior record44 or who were able to conceal
their record from the jury. The second group included all defendants
who had a record of which the jury was aware or defendants whom
the jury suspected of having prior convictions. 45 Given a prosecution
case of "normal" strength, it was discovered that the first group of
defendants, for whom no prior conviction evidence was admitted,
received acquittals in sixty-five per cent of the cases surveyed. How-
ever, the second group of defendants, those whom the jury knew or
suspected of prior convictions, received acquittals in only thirty-eight
percent of the cases surveyed. 40 Of the limited number of such studies
conducted, this project most dramatically illustrates the extreme prej-
udicial effect which admission of prior convictions may have on a
defendant's chance for acquittal-in spite of the "safeguard" afforded
by an admonitory instruction.
One result of this obvious prejudice against an accused with a
criminal record is that many such defendants are afraid to testify in
their own defense.47 The American Jury studies indicated that in cases
in which the evidence was "clearly for acquittal," only fifty-three per-
cent of the defendants with prior convictions elected to testify, while
ninety percent of the defendants with no prior record did testify.
The same study showed that in all cases surveyed, regardless of the
weight of the evidence, defendants with prior records testified in
seventy-four percent of the cases, which defendants without a prior
record testified in ninety-one percent of the cases.48 The obvious
conclusion is that defendants with criminal records (and more im-
43H. KALVEN & H. ZFSEL, THE AmamicA JuRY [hereinafter KALV &
ZErsEi] (1966). This book is the result of an extensive survey of all aspects ofjury psychology and methodology. It contains statistics which were compiled
from the results of elaborate questionnaires submitted by trial judges from all over
the country and which report the details of jury behavior in thousands of criminal
cases of every type.44 KALvEN & ZEisEL at 145. The study indicated that 53% of defendants are
first offenders with no prior record of conviction, leaving a substantial 47%
minority of all defendants who are subject to the dangers and prejudice inherent
in having a prior conviction revealed to the jury.
45 For this latter group, a typical admonitory instruction was given in most
cases.46 KALWvN & ZEISF_. at 160-61.
47 See 12 ST. Lous U.L.J.., supra note 8, at 278-80.4 8 KALVEN & ZESEL at 146-47.
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portantly, their lawyers) would rather give up their right to testify
in their own behalf than risk the prejudice which will result from
admission of their prior convictions. Such intimidation seems inex-
cusable, especially in light of the dubious value of admitting prior
convictions as an aid to evaluating credibility.49
Another factor that proponents of traditional defense ignore is the
obvious distrust that any jury has for any criminal defendant. A
leading case recognizing this element of distrust is Brown v. United
States.50 In Brown the court noted:
One need not look for prior convictions to find motivation to
falsify, for certainly that motive inheres in any case, whether or
not the defendant has a prior record. What greater incentive is
there than the avoidance of conviction? We can expect jurors to
be naturally wary of the defendant's testimony, even though they
may be unaware of his past conduct. 51
If the court in Brown is correct, then this natural suspicion should
more than compensate for any lack of knowledge of the prior con-
victions of a witness.5 2
The more realistic appraisal of the rationale for the rule admitting
prior-conviction evidence is simple-dishonest men cannot be relied
upon to tell the truth. As Justice Holmes observed:
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime,
the only ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is
the general readiness to do evil which the conviction may be sup-
posed to show. It is from that general disposition alone that the
jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and
thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to
prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself
and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general propo-
sition that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit.58
Thus it may be seen that the traditional rationale rests on the two
assumptions previously discussed, plus the dubious supposition that
conviction of a crime signifies bad character which in turn signifies a
propensity to testify falsely.
Several solutions to the problem have been proposed. In 1942, the
49 Closely related to this problem of intimidation and its tendency to dissuade
a defendant from testifying are a number of constitutional problems. See Note,
Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction
Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness,
37 U. CiN. L. REv. 168 (1968); 71 W. VA. L. 11-v., supra note 8, at 165-66.
50 370 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
51 Id. at 244.
52 See also Ladd, supra note 2, at 184-91.5 5 Gertz v. Fitchburg 1.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
KENTucK LAw JOURNAL
American Law Institutes Model Code of Evidence proposed limita-
tions on the use of evidence of prior convictions for impeachment of
a witness. The Model Code provides that the only evidence of prior
convictions admissible to the issue of the credibility of any witness is
proof of crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement."54 The Code
also provides that when a defendant testifies in his own behalf,
admission of prior convictions for impeachment is precluded unless
the accused first introduces evidence for the sole purpose of supporting
his credibility.55 Rule 21 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence is essentially
identical to the ALI proposed Model Code.15
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has taken a different approach for determining whether evidence of
prior convictions is admissible for the purpose of impeaching a witness.
In Luck v. United States,51 that court held that the statute allowing
impeachment by prior conviction evidence 5  did not give the prosecu-
tion an absolute right to introduce a defendant-witness' past convic-
tions but left its admission to the discretion of the trial judge. The
court proposed that the judge weigh the possible prejudicial effect of
such evidence against the "probative relevance of the prior conviction
to the issue of credibility."59 If the result of this balancing is the
probability of undue prejudice, then the prior conviction evidence
should be excluded. 0
In Luck the court outlines the criteria to be considered by a trial
judge in exercising this discretion:
In exercising discretion in this respect, a number of factors
might be relevant, such as the nature of the prior crimes, the length
54 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106 (1) (b) (1942).
55 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106(3) (1942).
E56 vidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime not involving dis-
honesty or false statement shall be inadmissible for the purpose of im-
pairing his credibility. If the witness be the accused in a criminal pro-
ceeding, no evidence of his conviction of a crime shall be admissible for
the sole purpose of impairing his credibility unless he has just introduced
evidence admissible solely for the purpose of supporting his credibility.
UNIFOBm RurEs OF EVIDENCE 21 (1953).
57 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
58 D.C. CODE § 14-305 (1961) read in pertinent part at that time:
No person shall be incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal
proceedings, by reason of his having been convicted of crime, but such
fact may be given in evidence to affect his credibility as a witness, either
upon the cross-examination of the witness or by evidence aliunde;
and the party cross-examining him shall not be concluded by his answers
as to such matters.
See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
59 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d at 768.
60 "This is a classic illustration of a case in which the prejudicial effect of
impeachment far outweighs the probative relevance of the prior convictions to the
issue of credibility." Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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of the criminal record, the age and circumstances of the defendant,
and, above all, the extent to which it is more important to the
search for truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the
defendant's story than to know of a prior conviction. The goal of a
criminal trial is the disposition of the charge in accordance with
the truth. The possibility of a rehearsal of the defendant's criminal
record in a given case, especially if it means that the jury will be
left without one version of the truth, may or may not contribute
to that objective. The experienced trial judge has a sensitivity
in this regard which normally can be relied upon to strike a
reasonable balance between the interests of the defendant and
of the public6O
In addition, the court accurately notes that the exercise of such dis-
cretion in following the criteria offered is certainly the type of standard
which trial judges are commonly asked to apply in a number of other
contexts.
62
Since the original Luck proposal, numerous cases have refined,6 3
explained and improved64 the concept. In Williams V. United States,65
it is suggested that the Luck issue is best raised before the defendant
testifies so that the decision to testify or not can be made in light of
the court's ruling. The defendant would also benefit, since "such a rule
would insulate the trial judge's discretion from the influence of his
own impressions as to the accused's credibility."6 6
Naturally, the Luck decision has not escaped criticism. In his
dissent from the majority opinion in Luck, Judge Danaher criticized
the discretionary approach as being clearly against the legislative
intent behind the impeachment statute which, he says, "tells the trier
[that] the fact of conviction is evidence, and it is to be received"6 7 if
the prosecution wishes to introduce it.6 9 Responding to this criticism,
Judge McGowan, the author of the Luck decision, notes:
61 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d at 769. These criteria are discussed at
length in Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1029 (1968).6 2 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d at 768. In Hood v. United States, 365
F.2d 949 (D.C. ir. 1966), the court notes:
The alert and experienced trial judge presiding over a criminal case
has a grasp of how the interests of justice are best served in the case
taking shape before him. He may conclude that the defendants story
should be heard by the jury; and Luck gives him some flexibility in this
regard. Id. at 951.63 E.g., Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968), in which the court proposes a "rule of thumb"
excluding past convictions for crimes of violence.
04 E.g., Brooke v. United States, 385 F.2d 279 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Brown v.
United States, 370 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1966).65 394 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion).
66 Id. at 964.6 7 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d at 771 (emphasis original).68 See State v. Hawthome, 49 N.J. 130, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (concurring
opinion), for elaboration on the points raised in the Luck dissent.
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Prosecutors today urgently need greatly expanded resources to
investigate and present criminal cases effectively. But the legisla-
ture should face up to these needs rather than to remain content
with cut-rate convictions gotten with the aid of prior criminal
records. 69
The only other important criticism of the Luck decision is the
argument that allowing this judicial discretion will result in a flood of
appellate controversy. 70 Why this is necessarily true is unclear-cer-
tainly there is no reason to suspect that trial judges are more likely to
abuse their discretion in a Luck issue determination than they are
in ruling on any other issue requiring judicial discretion. The Luck
opinion itself makes it clear that the trial judge's determination calls
for "the exercise of discretion and, as is generally in accord with sound
judicial administration, that discretion is to be accorded a respect
appropriately reflective of the inescapable remoteness of appellate
review."71 Thus the fear that a Luck approach will open the floodgates
of appellate litigation has no real foundation, and is no more likely
than the possibility of appellate review of any other discretionary
ruling.
The Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
69Blakney v. United States, 397 F.2d 648, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (con-
curring opinion). In Blakney, Judge McGowan gives an excellent presentation
of the whole basis for criticism of admission of prior conviction evidence. The
following quotation of the Blakney facts exemplifies a case in which admission of
such evidence was obviously a critical prejudicial factor:
Appellant in the case before us was indicted under two federal narcotics
statutes ostensibly directed against drug trafficking but which permit a
finding of guilt if there is evidence of possession which is unexplained.
26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 174. Conviction under each
statute entails a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment. The
case against appellant consisted solely of testimony by one police officer
that he saw appellant throw a vial containing heroin on the floor.
Another police officer with as good or better an opportunity to observe
appellant testified only that, although this could have happened without
his having seen it, he had not in tact seen appellant throw away any-
thing. This left appellant under the necessity of responding to the
evidence that he had possessed narcotics. He asked that a prior convic-
tion for robbery (eleven years before when, as was revealed for the first
time at the argument before us, he was 18) be not brought out upon
his taking the stand to testify that he had not had the narcotics but
had seen another person in the room throw them on the floor. The trial
court refused this request. The jury came in with the surprising and
unusual verdict of guilty under one statute and not guilty under the other.
These facts need only to be recited to suggest what the impact in
this case of the jury's knowledge of the robbery conviction might well
have been. They speak more eloquently than words of the hollowness
of the pretense that juries can and do heed the formal instruction that
they must regard the prior criminal conviction as relevant only to ap-
pellant's propensity to tell the truth rather than to commit crime. Id.
70State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130, 141, 228 A.2d 682, 690 (1967) (con-
curring opinion).
71 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d at 769.
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States District Courts and Magistrates also sets forth a solution. Its
recommendation reads:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the
crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2) in-
volved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment.72
[Emphasis added.]
In effect, the only convictions which are not admissible are misde-
meanors that do not involve dishonesty or false statement, thus the
proposal broadens the old common law rule in that it includes all
felonies and some misdeameanors, also. In view of the extensive and
valid criticism of impeachment by prior conviction evidence, it is
disappointing that the Proposed Rules expand rather than contract the
rule of admissability.
In the past the Kentucky Court of Appeals has faced all of the
previously discussed problems in trying to cope with the admissibility
of prior convictions for the purpose of impeachment. Impeachment
of witnesses in Kentucky is governed by Rule 43.07 of the Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure. 73 Traditionally the Court interpreted this
rule to mean that it was not allowable to impeach a witness by evidence
of, or to question him as to, particular acts or crimes or as to whether
or not he had been indicted. However, it was deemed proper to
impeach a witness, including a defendant in a criminal trial, by any
prior felony conviction. 4 Furthermore, historically the Kentucky
Court had allowed the cross-examiner to go into detail concerning the
prior conviction.75 But in an effort to protect the witness from the
72 CoI~mT ON RuLEs OF PRAcTicE AND PnocEDx-u, PRE mNARY DRAFT
OF PnoposED RuLrs OF EviDENcE FOR THE UNrrED STATES DisTucr CouRTs Abw
MAGcrsmATEs rule 6-09 (1969).
7 3 A witness may be impeached by any party, without regard to which
party produced him, by contradictory evidence, by showing that he bad
made statements different from his present testimony, or by evidence
that his general reputation for untruthfulness renders him unworthy of
belief; but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it
may be shown by the examination of a witness, or record of a judgment,
that he has been convicted of a felony. Ky. R. Civ. P. 43.07.
Some of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to criminal
cases; Rule 43.07 is one of these. Ky. CGuM. P. 13.04.74 Cowan v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1966); Hannah v. Com-
monwealth, 220 Ky. 368, 295 S.W. 159 (1927); Hayden v. Commonwealth,
140 Ky. 634, 131 S.W. 521 (1910); Britton v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 411, 96
S.W. 556 (1906); Howard v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 356, 61 S.W. 756 (1901);
Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735 (1901); Baker v. Com-
monwealth, 106 Ky. 212, 50 S.W. 54 (1899).75 Hannah v. Commonwealth, 220 Ky. 368, 295 S.W. 159 (1927). The Court
(Continued on next page)
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prejudice of disclosure to the jury of the details of a prior conviction,
the Court in 1966 in Cowan v. Commonwealth6 overturned this long
standing practice and stated:
It is our opinion that the original purpose of the impeachment
statute (now CR 43.07) in referring to proof by the record was to
provide against instances in which the witness might deny that he
had been convicted of a felony. When he admits it, there is no
reason to prove the record of conviction and, perforce, no reason
for such further details as may otherwise have been disclosed by it.
Henceforth the rule will be so construed. A witness may be asked
if he has been convicted of a felony. If he says "Yes," that must
be the end of it with the usual admonition. If he says "No,"
refutation by the record will be limited to one previous conviction,
again with the admonition. 7
Then in the spring of 1970, in Cotton v. Commonwealth,8 the Court
formulated what appears to be the best of the many proposed solutions
as to the use of prior felony convictions for impeachment. In this case
defendant Gilbert Cotton was found guilty by a jury of attempted
armed robbery and armed robbery. During the trial the prosecutor
had asked the defendant on cross-examination if he had been in the
penitentiary six times. The trial judge instructed the prosecutor to
ask only if the defendant had been convicted of a felony. Contrary
to the instruction, the prosecutor then said: "Tell the jury how many
times... *"79 The trial judge thereupon repeated his instruction that
the defendant simply be asked if he had been convicted of a felony.
The defendant then admitted a prior felony conviction. The trial
judge gave the customary instruction to the jury that this evidence
could only be used by the jury to determine the credibility of the
defendant as a witness and not substantively as evidence of guilt of
the crime for which he was charged. Cotton appealed, asserting that
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
in Cowan v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1966), commented upon the
historical rule as follows:
It is a procedural rule of evidence that a witness, including a defendant
who testifies for himself in a criminal case, may be impeached by proof
that he has been convicted of a felony. CR 43.07, formerly Civil Code
§ 597; RCr 13.04. Because the rule expressly allows it to be accomplished
by introduction of the record, this Court has always conceded the Com-
monwealth's right to elicit from the witness such details as would be
disclosed by the record of conviction if it were introduced. Cf. Hannah
v. Commonwealth, 220 Ky. 368, 295 S.W. 159, 160 (1927). This is the
technical theory through which the prosecution is able to escape being
confined to a mere showing that the witness has been convicted of a
felony, without further elaboration. Id. at 697-98.
76407 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1966).
77 Id. at 698.
78454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1970).
79 Id. at 701.
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the line of questioning employed by the prosecutor constituted
prejudicial error. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "prior
felony convictions involving dishonesty or false statements are the
only convictions that can be used to impeach a witness, including a
criminal defendant." 0
Since Kentucky, from the time of the adoption of the Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure, has allowed impeachment only by evidence
of the witness' general reputation for truthfulness, and not by evidence
of his reputation for any other characteristic,"' the decision in Cotton
produces a greater degree of consistency in the Kentucky case law of
impeachment.82 Furthermore, it is a compromise between the extremes
of the Proposed Rules, which are substantially the same as prior Ken-
tucky law, and the Uniform Rules and the Model Code, but assures
that if a defendant's prior conviction is admited, there is a valid
interest served. The defendant can now approach his trial without
facing the dilemma of prejudicial jury inferences from his failure to
testify and the prejudicial effect of "impeachment of his credibility"
by use of prior convictions that have no rational bearing on his truthful-
ness.88
By giving the trial judge limited discretion in admitting this
evidence a flexible approach to these problems is assured. The Court
in Cotton noted that the Cowan ruling should be modified to the
extent of
8Old.81 McHargue v. Perkins, 295 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1956). The Court in con-
struing Rule 43.07 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure stated:
This rule effects a significant change in Kentucky practice. It sup-
plants Civil Code Sections 596 and 597.
The latter Civil Code section provided for impeachment of a witness
'by evidence that his general reputation for untruthfulness or immorality
renders him unworthy of belief.' The right to impeach by evidence that
ones general reputation for untruthfulness renders the witness un-
worthy of belief has been retained in CR 43.07. This is essentially the
same as the corresponding portion of Civil Code Section 597. The com-
panion right to impeach by showing the general reputation for immorality
was not included in the new rule. Thus, the trial court was correct in
rejecting the reputation testimony as to the morality of appellee, but
was in error in refusing to admit the evidence as to her general reputation
for untruthfulness. Id. at 301.
82 Professor Wigmore in his treatise stated:
In those jurisdictions in which veracity-character alone is allowed to be
used to impeach, it would logically follow that when particular instances
of misconduct are allowed to be used as throwing light on credibility-
that is to say, conviction of crime, when shown by extrinsic evidence,
and other misconduct, when brought out on cross-examination-oni
such instances should be used as are relevant to show a lack of truthful-
ness of disposition, - for example, forgery, cheating, and the like. 3 WiG-
Mo E § 926.8 For a clear and concise presentation of the problems faced by a defendant
with a prior criminal record, in determining whether or not to testify, see 4 CoLum.
J. LAw & Soc. PoB. 215 (1968).
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... allowing impeachment of a witness, including a defendant in a
criminal case, by proof of conviction of felonies that rest on dis-
honesty, stealing, and false swearing, subject, however, to vested
discretion, although limited in scope, in the trial judge to limit such
evidence. The exercise of discretion by the trial judge in this area
should primarily consist of weighing the interest of society in the
prosecution of criminal defendants to provide the trial jury with
relevant evidence of the witness' untrustworthiness to be believed
against the possible prejudice to the witness, particularly in the
case of a criminal defendant, in being convicted not of the crime
for which he is charged but of some other crime for which he has
been convicted and punished on some prior occasion.8 4 (Emphasis
added.)
In addition, the Court noted that the "nearness or remoteness of the
prior conviction is a relevant factor to consider in exercise of this
discretion."m The Court also recommended that the age and circum-
stances of the defendant-witness be considered in ruling on the ad-
missibility of past conviction evidence.8 6
By formulating the standard that the prior conviction must rest on
dishonesty or false statement,87 there will be more consistency in the
decisions of trial judges than there would be if the Luck doctrine were
adopted. When the prior conviction is deemed admissible by the trial
judge, allowing the prosecution to disclose the nature of crime and
the number of convictions8 will provide reliable assistance to the jury
and will not unduly prejudice the defendant.8 9 Thus, in Cotton, the
84 Cotton v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d at 701.85 Id. at 701-02.
86 Id. at 702.
87 While discussing what convictions involve dishonesty or false statement
the Court in Cotton stated:
By crimes involving dishonesty, stealing, and false swearing, we mean
such felonies as perjury, subordination of perjury, obtaining money or
property under false pretenses, forgery, embezzlement, counterfeiting,
fraudulent alterations, misappropriation of funds, false personation, pass-
ing checks without sufficient funds or on nonexistent banks, fraudulent
destruction of papers or wills, fraudulent concealment, making false
entries, and all felonies involving theft or stealing. 454 S.W.2d at 702.
Finally noting that the list of crimes is not all-encompassing, the Court reaffirmed
its earlier confidence "that trial judges are capable of determining whether the
particular prior felony involves a crime of dishonesty, stealing or false swearing."
id.
88 Concerning disclosure of the nature of the crime and the number of con-
victions, the Court in Cotton noted:
Under our modification of the Cowan rule, once the question of
admissibility is determined the witness may be asked on cross-examination
if he has been convicted of the specific offenses. If he denies such con-
victions, proper documentary proof, without restriction to the number of
prior convictions, may be then introduced, controlled, however, by the
sound discretion of the trial judge in the particular case. 454 S.W.2d
at 702.
89 Concerning a Florida statute identical to the Kentucky rule in Cowan
(Continued on next page)
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court has balanced the prejudicial effect of prior convictions against
their probative value to elicit the soundest of presently proposed rules.
James T. Hodge
Kenneth Gregory Haynes9"
F~mny LAw-CusToDY oF C=Rmt_.-andall Floyd James, age seven,
was taken by his divorced father to live with Randall's aunt and uncle
due to the illness of Randall's grandparents, with whom the son and
father were living. Randall's father later advised the aunt and uncle
that he was going to remarry. This news upset the aunt and uncle and
they asked Randall's father to sign a contract relinquishing custody
of Randall to them. The father refused to sign the contract. After
repeated efforts to regain custody, during which time he was prevented
on numerous occasions from seeing his son, the father instituted this
proceeding in December of 1966. The Jefferson Circuit Court,
Chancery Division, awarded custody to the aunt and uncle. The
father appealed. Held: Reversed.1 The natural parent is entitled to
the custody of his child unless it is shown that the natural parent is
unsuitable to have custody. James v. James, 457 S.W.2d 261 (Ky.
1970).
Deborah Mandelstam, age six, was placed in the custody of a
rabbi of a local Jewish temple, as a result of divorce proceedings in
Fayette Circuit Court between her parents. The chancellor found
that the mother was of such a mental condition that it would not be
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
that limited the prosecution to only disclosing whether the defendant bad been
convicted of a felony and nothing more it has been said:
The aim of protecting the witness rom needless exposure of his past is
sought to be accomplished in Florida by means of imposing restrictions
upon the examination procedure, rather than upon the definition of crimes
within the rule. If the witness admits the bare fact of his past con-
viction at the outset, he is shielded from further questioning. In practical
effect, however, this procedure neither aids the jury nor protects the
witness. Mere knowledge that the witness has been convicted of a crime
-perhaps murder, perhaps a traffic violation-will more probably mis-
lead than assist the jury. At the same time, the reputation of the
witness is subjected to doubts and suspicions that may be more damaging
than full revelation of his actual record. 15 FLA. L. REv. 220, 228
(1962).90 Mr. Haynes is a former staff member of the Kentucky Law Journal, and is
a 1970 graduate of the University of Kentucky College of Law.
1 The record did not contain any specific finding of fact as to whether the
natural parent was fit. The case was remanded on the procedural issue of burden
of proof, and findings as to the fitness of the parent or the best interests of the
child were left to the lower court.
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